In this essay we shall use topological and dynamical concepts, especially those developed by Rene Thom and others in catastrophe theory, for the study of word meaning. Many semanticists believe that logics and algebra are the only formal means adequate for the constructiori of a semantic theory. They point to a strong tradition reaching from Aristotle to medieval philosophy and to modern philosophers äs Carnap, Montague, Cresswell and others. There exists, however, another tradition starting with Heraclitus (544 to 483 B.C.) which considers the world essentially äs something changing and governed by dynamic principles. The basic invariant forms are called logos. In modern times gestalt-psychology and, parallel to it, field-linguistics have taken up this tradition, seeking dynamic principles in the organization of cognition and language. We shall not pursue the issue of historical continuity or the question of the merits of the static-logical paradigm against the dynamic-geometrical paradigm.
The most far-reaching and mathematically riebest dynamic theory of semantics has been proposed by Rene Thom (1968 : Topologie et Linguistique, 1973 , who is the founder of catastrophe theory. Its application to word semantics is based on a larger research work (Wildgen, 1979 a) which integrated the short and sketchy proposals of Rene Thom into the modern framework of interdisciplinary research in semantics.
We shall first present some results of research on human perception of processes, objects and qualities which allow the formulation of some crucial problems of a semantic model which has a cognitive foundation (in chapter one). In chapter two we discuss the semiotic basis of semantics, chapter three introduces the techniques of catastrophe-theoretical modelling and chapter four contains dynamic models related to the problems raised in chapter one. As this is the first essay on catastrophe-theoretical models in word semantics, we have not touched the problem of vagueness and the description of nominal compounding for which Solutions have been proposed in Wildgen, 1980b and Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 235
Foundations for a Theory of Word Semantics

Is the Word a Significant Unit?
The title of this reader presupposes that there is a significant unit called "word", and that a semantic theory must describe it more or less separately. But this presupposition is not obvious äs the recent history of linguistics has rather negated the existence of a universal category "word". The relevant positions are summarized in Barri, 1977: "To me the results of these early discussions seem final: the word äs we use it is not a linguistic unit but an inexact everyday term, differing in each language and inconsistent within each language in accordance with local conventions of word-separation. ... In linguistically pertinent descriptions the word has no Status or "level of analysis" of its own. It is an accidental agglutination of elements, each word-type happening to cover different morpheme-paradigms, äs luck would have it."
This position is perhaps extreme, but it points to some fundamental problems. The Separation of levels of linguistic description is, however, less crucial for a dynamic theory which is not hierarchic in the same way äs structuralist models. The mechanisms which will be exposed in chapters 3 and 4 can be applied to word semantics äs well äs to sentence semantics (perhaps even to text semantics, cf. Petitot, 1977) . In this essay, we shall, however, primarily deal with phenomena which are traditionally considered äs belonging to word semantics (lexicology). It is irrelevant for our treatment to ask-whether the distinction of the linguistic level of "words" is appropriate or even universally applicable.
We assume that the dynamic principles governing the semantics of words are intricately connected with basic propositional structures. This is especially true for verbs. Our dynamic treatment of verbs Starts with a consideration of the dynamic principles underlying the perception of space and time and of changes, motion, locomotion and action in space and time. The basic assumption underlying our dynamic theory is that semantic phenomena can be explained:
(a) by the structure of our perception, (b) by the structure of the organization of human memory and of human memory retrieval.
The organization of memory is conceived äs a selective mechanism which retains the most stable and the most characteristic features which have been perceptually registered. This assumption is plausible in the domain of microsemantics where the syntactic Organisation and the pragmatic and inferential mechanisms are rather poor. In a general semantic theory our archetypal and dynamic component would be a basic stratum whose influence becomes weaker äs we progress to the levels of syntax and text (conversation).
In the following sections we shall primarily consider the perceptual mechanism underlying the use of words.
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Perception of Space and Time äs a Basis for the Semantics of Nominals and Verbs
In the first months of child development (up to 20 weeks) the child is not able to perceive the identity of objects under the impact of local or temporal changes, i.e. it has not yet acquired the ability to form a complete cognitive Image of an object. This ability is, however, acquired in a predictable manner, so that one can speak of a perceptually based concept. The development is independent of the specific social context and of the language to which the child is exposed. The child abstracts from perspectives, contextual and temporal frames in its first concept (for an attempt to integrale such ideas in the framework of intensional semantics cf. Lieb, 1979 ; psycholinguistic research in this domain was done by Piaget, 1955 , Harris, 1973 , Butterworth, 1975 and Bamberg, 1979 . Later on, this concept will be enriched by various social evaluations, functional embeddings etc. We call this second stage in the development: attribution stage (cf. Heider, 1958 and Jones et alii, 1971) . On the level of dynamic semantics, we concentrate on the first stage, the biologically controlled development of semantics (the second stage appeals to socio-psychological mechanisms). We can state the fact mentioned above in more formal terms. Initially an object, O, is a domain of existence in space-time. As solid objects cannot overlap spatially (and this kind of objects is primary for our perception), the domain of an object is a first definition of the object. As the child moves (or is moved) and äs the object moves or is moved, the domain changes, so that the child perceives many different object-forms. The cognitive development of the child consists then in finding the invariant of "object-forms" under different movements or deformations of the object; this is a necessary achievement prior to naming and labelling.
The perception of processes and their classification is even more difficult because of their transient nature. The recognition of fundamental processes is, however, of paramount importance for the newborn. Our hypothesis states that the newborn is already able to control a limited set of processes (a first learning stage can have occurred already in the womb). Examples of these would be sucking, i. e. taking in fluid material through the mouth and primitive grasping. Even fundamental movements, like primitive walking, seem to be pre-programmed. The first processes controlled by the child are at the same time evolutionarily old processes which are fundamental for the control of primitive animal behavior.
(a) Eating, drinking: more generally absorbing an external object or material.
Biologically this process is already present in unicellulars. O (b) Secrete, expell: this is the reverse process of (a) Fig. 2 (c) Grasp, take: this activity is one stage higher in the evolution of the control of one's behavior äs it presupposes the existence and the use of limbs, i.e. it is performed by a specialized part of the body. Schematically we have: (d) The reverse process of (c) is that of pushing, throwing
The deeper hypothesis underlying archetypal dynamics says that those process types naturally emergent in living organisms are correlated with dynamic Systems and their evolution under deformation. The reason why the formal mechanism of catastrophe theory should model natural processes has to do with the concepts of structural stability and deformation explicated by this theory. These concepts correlate to fundamental self-regulatory mechanisms in living beings.
This hypothesis can be reduced to a simpler assumption (loosing, however, the neurolinguistic and evolutionary dimension) which states that catastrophe theory offers a language for the description of events preserving their dynamic character. Events can now be described in a language adapted to the object under consideration.
Events (processes, changes, motions, actions) can be different in multiple ways. First the objects supporting an event typically change their location and their aspect (showing different sides). The constancy of object perception is therefore a precondition of event perception. Second the event itself can be timed differently and be partially obscured (i.e. the object can, for a short Stretch of time, be occluded). Finally, the event can be embedded in a complex series of events with repetitions and a change in the objects.
The hypothesis underlying our semantic treatment of events states that they are perceived rather locally and expanded by generalization. This means that there are specific points (dramatic centers) in an event, such that the characteristics of the event can be derived from the process going on in the immediate environment of these points.
To illustrate this crucial point we schematize the event of a cat chasing a mouse. The lines in Fig. 4 symbolize the free movement of the animals. Both come into the (experimental) scene at the left, the cat catches the mouse, holds it for a Stretch of time, lets it go and finally catches and devours the mouse. We can distinguish four different types of local events: (C = cat, M = mouse) (a) The objects C and M enter the scene, (b) the objects C and M are in the scene, (c) the object C catches the object M, (d) the object C lets go off the object M, the object M gets away from the object C, (e) the sarne äs (c). (a), (c) and (d) are singular poihts (isolated) where a change takes place. On the other hand (b) has no singular points and nöthing drämatic happens in the environfnent of (b): (b) is not an event. This rather intuitive vietv öf events is the basis for our dynamic treatment in chapter four, where the" points (a), (c) and (d) are derived from different types of catastrophes (= types of fast dynamic changes). We shall introduce the mathematical tools for an exact treatment of basic processes in chapter three.
The perception of objects and processes gets more complicäted äs the child is exposed to social experience. In rather simple tests of the permanence of objects Bower (1966) showed that whereas very young children (20 days old) reacted strongly to the disappearance of an object hidden for a short time, they did not react to qualitative changes of these objects (color and shape differences). The children of the middle group (40, 60 days old) also reacted to shape/color and to shape differences, whereas the children of the last group (80 days old) also reacted to simple color differences. A consequence of this and of other results is that the child successively acquires a "component structure" of events and processes (cf. also Gibson, 1969: 386) . We shall not discuss the theories concerned with the elaboration of this component structure (cf. the "semantic feature theory" of Clark, 1973 and for a critique Bamberg, 1979 ). Ün a more fundamental level one can ask how specific qualities are differentiated on the basis of universal perceptual mechanisms. That is to say, we shall consider the first stage where the child passes from quality perception to a semantic classification which is the basis for the linguistic componentstructure of words.
The Perception and Classification of Colors
The controversy about human perception of brightness and colors is very old. An important theory was put forward by Young in the 18th Century and was developped by Helmholz to give the trichromatic scheme which states that there are three fundamental colors: red, green and blue (violet) . The values white and black should be the result of an equal distribution of these fundamental colors (for white) or of zero excitation (for black). The modern form of the trichromatic scheme is much more elaborate, it points to the (inferred) existence of three different cone photoreceptors with differently selective photochemical substances (cf. Hurwich, 1960: 200) . One of the proponents of this theory is W. S. Stiles who says:
"The crux of the trichromatic scheme is that at some stage in the visual process, all light Stimuli, whatever their spectral eneirgy compositions, are converted into an activity specifiable by three variables, and whatever the subsequent elaborations of the response System, Stimuli leading to the same values of these variables produce the same visual effects. The further condition must be added that a specification by two variables is not possible. In human colour vision the number of variables (dimension number) is arrived at by experiments on the colour matching of mixtures of Stimuli." (Stiles, 1960: 187) This theory was already challenged in the nineteenth Century by Heringer (1874) who proposed a four-color-scheme with oppositions between redgreen and yellow -blue (and a third pair black -white}. Von Kries (1878) tried to reconcile the two theories in his theory of zones which admitted a three-variable scheme at the level of photo-receptors in the retina and its transformation into a four-color Opponent scheme in the later stages of neural connections. Today the two positions are still controversial (cf. Stiles, 1960 and Hurwich, 1960 and for a comparison of the two Krantz, 1975) .
Physiological research has corroborated the opponent-cell hypothesis of Hering, since Svaetichin and MacNichol (1958) found Opponent schemes in electroretinograms of fish eyes and since the physiological studies by De Valois and Jacobs (1968) confirmed this scheme in monkeys. We can therefore take äs given that at a certain stage of retinal color perception the opponent-color scheme is a reality.
These findings acquire dramatic significance when compared to linguistic and anthropological studies of color-naming. Since the classical investigation by Berlin & Kay (1969) which was based on a sample of 98 languages, the field has been very thoroughly investigated (cf. Wattenwyhl & Zollinger, 1979 for a rather short review). As Kay & McDaniel (1978) and Wattenwyl & Zollinger (1979) show, the linguistic results are in correspondence with the opponentcolor scheme which seems to be a universal psychological precondition for cultural color encoding. The existence of such prelinguistic schemes had already been confirmed by anthropological research. Rösch Heider and Olivier summarized their comparison of English and Dani (New Guinea) color naming, saying: "In conclusion, we wish to argue that, although there are linguistic variables which correlate with color memory accuracy under certain conditions, the nature of color memory images themselves and the way in which they structure the color space in memory appear little influenced by language." (Rösch Heider & Olivier, 1972: 352) On the basis of these preliminary Statements we can formulate our own position.
Assumption
The semantics of color-words is partially governed by underlying perceptual mechanisms (the opponent-cells scheme) and partially by cultural conventions.
Our dynamic reconstruction of this part of the lexicon will be built on these prerequisites. We shall therefore briefly summarize the basic physiological and anthropological findings.
Kg5 is a simplified Version of Fig5 in De Valois & Jacobs (1958: 539) , where the discharge patterns of the six principal types of macaque (primate) lateral geniculate-nucleus cells in response to various light flashes were measured. The thickness of the bars indicates the intensity of firing. The relative intensity of reaction of the four cell types show maxima and minima, which correspond to the Opposition referred to in the labelling of these cells. The (+ B -Y) cells have a reaction maximum with blue light (450 nm) and a minimum with yellow light (500 nm) and so on.
As Figure 5b does not directly consider the fact that the Opponent cells operate together, we can estimate a combined measure for the two Opposition pair (±B Y) and (± G, ±R). We get functions with two main maxima. and 6b show the results (compare Hurvich & Jameson, 1957 : 396, Krantz, 1975 : 307 and Kay & MC Daniel, 1978 619, where the same facts are displayed with the help of Opponent scales). I'or the Opposition "white-black" the curve with two maxima is even sharper äs Fig 5 a has already suggested. The linguistic-anthropological research on color terms is largely congruent with these results. Kay & MC Daniel (1978: 629-636 ) distinguish: (a) six primary color categories (white, black, red, yellow, green, blue) (b) composite categories: these occur in all stages that have not yet developped terms for all six primary color categories, e.g. rax = grue in Quechi (c) derived categories: they are intersections of the primary category terms, e.g. orange, Moreover, the cultural evolution of color-terminology follows laws predictable by the opponent-color scheme. Kay & MC Daniel (1978) Kay & McDaniel (1978: 639 (Fig. 13 ) and 640f))
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The development at stages VI and beyond encodes intersections of primaries and produces the color terms: brown, pink, orange, purple, grey etc. The development is still going on and one can observe how several presently nonbasic color terms become basic in parts of the linguistic Community (aqua/ turquoise (green + blue), marron/burgundy (black + red), chartreuse/lime (yellow + green) (cf. Kay & MC Daniel, 1978: 641) .
In chapter four we shall reconstruct both the field character of color perception and labellings äs well äs the dynamics of color naming evolution in the framework of archetypal dynamics. Fig 6a and 6b äs well äs the patterns of successive differenciation of a lexical field in Fig 7 strongly suggest a dynamic modelling, which is more natural than traditional classificatory schemes or the fuzzinezz-model of Kay & MC Daniel (1978) .
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Motion Qualities and Their Labelling
The perception of motion has to fulfill at least three main functions (cf. Richards, 1977: 427) : 1. It must disregard the effect of the average flow of motion to perceive differential local movement. 2. The motion analyzer "should be made up of antagonistic pairs of units, in which each of the subunits (arrows) responds optionally to movement in the same direction" (ibidem). 3. It must be able to pay selective attention to different motion chännels. Our knowledge about the neural mechanisms achieving these functions is, however, poor. We can only consider very basic principles, such äs the one realized by the Barlow-Levic motion detectors. Given a general direction of motion, one can distinguish the perception of moving "bugs" and moving edges. The excitation of the detector is symbolized by -» + the correspondent inhibition by -» ~.
8b
"bug" nedge Tfie mechanism is similar to the opponent-cell scheme mehtioned in the last section. It also points to a dynamic model containirig antagonistically organized fields. We shall propose a first dynamic description of these antagonistically organized fields.
In the first sections of this chapter we pointed out archetypal activities which are evolutionarily very old and whose control and recognition is biologically prestructured. At an intermediate level betweeh fundamental motion perception and archetypal activities we find simple movements like walking, running, jumping. These are locomotiön-schemes, which are partially inborn (the newborn shows walking reflexes, which are lost in later development).
The studies of Johansson (1973 Johansson ( , 1975 Johansson ( , 1977 show that human locomotion has a very clear structure which can be described äs a cornpositioh of cyclical movements of critical points of the body. In Johansson, 1977 : 391 he traced on film lines of movement by attaching light Spots to the joints of a person and in Johansson, 1975 : 384f he presented a vector-analysis of the movements of hip, knee and ankle in human locomotion. Our hypothesis is that the funda-mental cyclic motion schemes underlying these structures are parallel to the contraction movements of the heart, which is an archetype of human locomotion (in a more general sense). We shall elaborate this hypothesis in chapter four. This principle has already been applied in the opponent-cell scheme and in the scheme of differential movement recognition.
Bipolarity in the Naming of Qualities
It is a well known fact that many adjectives, especially those which are gradable:
(1) occupy, antagonistic positions in the underlying quality space (in a specific quality dimension), (2) that they are context-dependent in the sense, that their denotation depends on the nominal head which is modified, or even on larger contexts of use. In linguistic literature these adjectives are called "relative adjectives" (Bartsch, 1972) , "measure adjectives", "adjectives of degree" (Cresswell, 1976) or "polar adjectives" (Kaiser, 1979) . The problem is a traditional one, but the formal treatments up to now have not caught the fundamental mechanisms of this field of word semantics. If we consider criteria (1) and (2) above in the light of the psychological analyses in the last passages of this chapter, we will notice that in (1) the principle of antagonistic organization reappears. This has already applied in the opponent-cells scheme and in the scheme for differential movement recognition. The criterium (2) (above) is strongly related to the constancy effects we have already noticed. That is to say, features are detected in contrast to a uniform background. The fact that many adjectives tend to bipolarity seems to be a universal. The cross-cultural application of the semantic differential by Osgood, May & Mivon (1975 : 352) showed a remarkable stability of the typical polar scales used in this method.
The hypothesis of a universal bipolar nature of modifiers would be too strong. One has to consider:
(1) The multi-sense or even homonymous nature of many adjectives. The adjective "old" Stands for the whole scale, whereas in (ii) it stand only for a specific domain of the scale: (ii) Andrew is old We shall consider some fundamental features of this important field of word semantics in section 4.4.2. The concepts of scale and of dominant zones of the scale call for a dynamic treatment in our framework.
The Main Tasks of a Dynamic Model in Word Semantics
In the last few sections of this chapter we have sketched a series of fundamental problems in the domain of word semantics, which call for a treatment in the framework of a theory of word semantics. The list of problems could easily be extended to semantic fields and to diachronic changes in the lexicon. We have chosen to deal with rather fundamental problems because our descriptive tools are not yet fully developed (the research done in Wildgen, 1979a is the first since Thom proposed his theory in the late sixties).
The next chapters will develop a larger semiotic framework, in which our model can be embedded. The dynamic theory of semantics is not a new variant of structural or logical semantics; one has to go further back both historically and in relation to the semiotic foundations of semantics, to describe its philosophical presuppositions.
The Semiotic Basis of Our Topological-Dynamic Modelling
We must go back to the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 Peirce ( -1914 who was a contemporary of Frege1. His logical and semiotic conceptions are a good framework for the development of a dynamic semantic theory, because he is not yet affected by the reductionism typical for the semantics proposed by logicians (Wittgenstein was the most lucid critic of this "philosophy"; cf. Wildgen, 1977a: 128-133) .
Peirce understands the semiotic sign äs a triadic (irreducible) relationship between: representamen, interpretant and object. "A sign, or representamen, is something which Stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It adresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign Stands for something, its object. It Stands for that object, not in all'respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representation. "Idea" is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense very familiär in everyday talk;" (Peirce, 2.228) A first consequence of the irreducible triadicity of the sign is that although semantics is primarily concerned with the relation between representamen (sign form) and object, the relation of both to the interpretant cannot be simply eliminated. Unlike realistic semantics we must consider the "subjective -internal" aspect of meaning. Semantics without consideration of the user is nonsense, because objects are only correlated with signs (representamens) in the context of the semiotic activity of a sign user. A secondary consequence concerns the relation of semantics to psychology and sociology. As the semiotic act has psychological and sociological aspects, every semantic analysis has to be integrated into the field of socio-and psycho-linguistic research. The splendid isolation of logical semantics is theoretically unsound.
The relation between representamen and object (Peirce's Secondness) can be subdivided into three aspects: -Icon -Index -Symbol These aspects are ordered insofar äs Index uses iconic principles and Symbol makes use of iconic and indexical devices. The iconic aspect is therefore the fundamental aspect of the relation between sign and object. Semantics must for that reason have an iconic foundation.
"The only way of directly communicating an idea is by means of an icon; and every indirect method of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon the use of an icon. Hence, every assertion must contain an icon or a set of icons, or eise must contain signs whose meaning is only explicable by icons." (Peirce, 2, 278) An icon can be an image, a diagram or a metaphor (Peirce, 2.277) . Its prominent feature is the similarity of object and representamen. The philosophical reflections of Peirce become more concrete, if we interpret our perception and memory äs a sort of similarity transformation from the "outer world" which is perceived and experienced to the "inner world" of thought and behavioral planning. The iconic basis of semantics is in this perspective correlated with a world of cognitive analoga in the mind of the sign users.
Peirce's conception of a similarity äs the basis of the iconic aspect of signs is too rough. There are two dimensions which have to be added:
(1) Stability.
As the similarity underlying the iconic relation is always partial, it is astonishijng that changes in situations and different constellations of sign users (interpretants) do not destabilize the similarity. Each term of the triadic relation is exposed to deformations. The object in the triad can take different forms in time. The sign can change in time or with different sign users. The interpretants themselves are exposed to social and psychological Variation. Moreover the kernel of the similarity relation, i.e. those features which are constitutive for the existence of a specific iconic relation can change without dramatically altering the relation. The calculi Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 247 developed in differential topology over the last twenty years allow a theoretically much preciser modelling of the nature of the iconic relationship. (2) Selectivity.
Even a photograph reproduces the object only modulo certain simplifications. Selectivity becomes even more dramatic, if we consider diagrams or metaphors. Two sources of selectivity can be considered: (a) Catastrophic selectivity. Our internal model of the world selects prominent features, i.e. it prefers dramatic (high energy) features over smooth (low energy) features. Looking at a picture, the eye follows the edges, the lines which separate relatively smooth areas. The borderlines are lines of catastrophic changes (changes from one area to another).
Looking at an event we select periods of rapid change for the scoping of our attention and for memory storage (cf. chapter 1.2.).
(b) Social selectivity. Certain features are of special interest for our selfevaluation, social position and our goal-oriented activities. In our theory of archetypal dynamics we shall consider the dimensions l and 2 a; dimension 2b should be elaborated in a socio-psychological framework. We call this level "socio-attributive dynamics".
The concepts of "structural stability", of "invariance of structure under the influence of dynamic deformation" and of "catastrophic jump" are central concepts of catastrophe theory. We shall therefore sketch the mathematical framework of this theory.
Techniques of Catastrophe Theoretical Modelling
In this chapter we shall give a very brief introduction to the mathematical tool we want to employ. For a more detailled description cf. Brüter, 1976 : 47-247, Poston, 1979 , Poston & Stewart, 1978 and Wildgen, 1979a . We shall first consider the most simple dynamical Systems (= differential equations) and introduce a mathematical correlate of the preformal notions "deformation" and "structural stability" which we have already used in the last sections.
l Some Simple Dynamical Systems and the Concepts of "Deformation" and
"Structural Stability" We consider real-valued and smooth functions f: IRn -» IR (IR = real numbers, IRn = n-dimensional space of real numbers). We can distinguish two principal types of functions (in case n = 1):
the exponent is even
We shall first consider the main characteristics of these functions, especially their dynamic features. Second we shall "deform" them to check their stability under deformation.
(
This function is linear (f: IR -» IR) and has no critical point (maximum, minimum, saddle). We can prove this by Computing the first derivation:
The graph of f'(x) is a line parallel to the x-axis; it does not intersect with the x-axis.
The first derivation gives us:
This function has one root at x = 0. The second derivation gives a constant:
The critical point of this function is a minimum.
If we consider the function f (x) = -x2, we get a maximum instead of a minimum. Fig. 9 shows the graph of f (x) and its derivations. The first derivation can be represented by a vector-field äs in Fig. 10 . The arrows along the x-axis indicate the force and direction of the vector-field at several points on the x-axis.
r/r/f Fig. 9 (As our framework is a topological one we can neglect the specific metric of the scales.)
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We can now deform the function f (x) 8 is a small constant. x2 by adding a function p(x) = 2 ex;
Seeking for critical points we consider:
The critical point is situated at g'(x) = 2x + 2e = 0 i.e. at x = -e.
Fig . 11 shows the original function f(x) and the function g(x) produced by the deformation of f(x). e is assumed to take the value2.
Fig. 11
The two functions f(x) and g(x) are equivalent (by "diffeomorphism") äs their difference can be eliminated by a simple transformation of the coordinates. They have the same number and type of critical points (i.e. a minimum). In this case we say that the function (f (x) = x2) is structurally stähle. Small deformations can be reduced by a smooth transformation of the coordinates. The term "small deformation" can be defined, if we compare not only the function f(x) to the deformed function g(x) but also the corresponding derivations. Fig. 12 (cf. Callahan, 1974 : 222 f) shows a deformation which is not small. Whereas g(x) is still similar to f (x) = x2 (and this similarity can be extended to f'(x) versus g'(x)), g"(x) is not at all comparable to f"(x) (f"(x) is a line having no critical point whereas g"(x) has three critical points. We can conclude that the function f (x) = x2 is structurally stähle under small deformations. This is not the case for the following functions: 251 We can deform this function adding p(x) = ex; 8 is a small constant.
As Fig. 14 shows, g(x) is not structurally stable; different values of e lead to structurally different results. Whereas f (x) = g(x) (B = 0) has one critical point (a saddle), g(x) (e < 0) has tow critical points (a maximum and a minimum) and g(x) (e > 0) has no critical point. The Situation is similar for the following functions; we abbreviate our description by giving only the graphs corresponding to Fig. 14.
When 8 is negative, the function g(x) has three critical points:
The graph of this function is similar to that of f (x) = x3, but it is more flat at the origin. Fig. 16 shows that the deformed function g(x) takes maximally four critical points. 
Universal Unfolding and the Classification of Elementary Catastrophes
In the last section we have shown the basic distinction between structurally stable functions (dynamical Systems) and structurally unstable ones. The consideration of deformations of the first monomic functions has suggested that the evolution of these dynamical Systems after deformation is rather systematic. We can ask ourselves now if there are general laws governing the evolution of such Systems after destabilization. If such laws exist we should be interested in two questions:
(1) Are these evolutions structurally stable? If they are, we can consider them äs basic types of processes. (2) Can we find a classification of types of stable evolutions of dynamical Systems? If such a classification exists, it could be the basis for a typology of fundamental processes.
The theory of stable unfoldings developed by Thom, Arnol'd, Zeeman and others gives a positive answer to these questions. In the present context we must confine our treatment to the main results obtained in this field, namely the list of elementary catastrophes (= simple universal unfoldings with corang < 2). The factors which in the last section "deformed" the original function are now systematically classified. They are called external variables or unfolding variables. The universal unfoldings are those (versal) unfoldings which cannot be further reduced. They are irreducible in the sense that they contain only those external variables which are necessary for the stability of the unfolding. The variables contained in the organizing center of the unfolding (the "germ") are called infernal variables. Consequently the unfolding function has two argument positions: f(x, u) such that x = {xl5 . . ., xn} e IRn and u = (uls . . ., uk} e IRk. f(x, u): IRn X Rk^ IR.
IRn: is the space of infernal variables. Zeeman calls it the state space or the behavior (effect)-space.
IR : is the space of external variables. Zeeman calls it the control space, because external variables are often interpreted äs factors which control (or cause) processes and activities.
As the classification of universal unfoldings is mathematically very difficult and lengthy we refer to Zeeman & Trotman (1973) (an introductory exposition is given in Wildgen, 1979a: 95-98) . Table l This very sketchy exposition of a central part of catastrophe theory should be commented on:
(1) The unfoldings mentioned are very large equivalent classes; the functions contained in Table l are only normal form. (2) The classification is strictly local, i.e. one only considers singular points and their environment. The combination of simple dynamical Systems to global ones is part of the "syntax" of catastrophes. The very difficult problems of global catastrophe theory are not yet solved (cf. Jänich, 1977 for some issues in this domain). (3) The set of internal variables (cf. the corang) can be augmented by the addition of expressions containing other variables. Such an enrichment does not change the classification of universal unfoldings äs these forms can be splitted off. (4) We can also augment the number of external variables by considering versal unfoldings.
The applicability of this classification of types of evolutions in dynamical Systems is therefore much larger then the enumeration in Table l suggested.
Gradient-Dynamics and Catastrophes
The mathematical framework outlined in the last sections will be specified by postulating additional features of the dynamical Systems under consideration. The first specification introduces the notion of "gradient-field". We assume for our applications that all the attractors of the dynamical System are points (in 1R": the space of internal variables). This assumption is rather restrictive äs many other types of dynamics are possible. Fig. 17 opposes point-attractors with oscillating attractors (type "Hopf").
affracfor repel l or a ff. pol n t äff. cirde Fig. 17 This assumption is motivated by the great amount of physical applications of this type of dynamics (cf. the gravitational dynamics) and by the fact that this is the simplest assumption. Brüter (1978: 8 ) says:
"La theorie des catastrophes elementaires ne fait appel qu'ä des dynamiques gradients. On peut donc, ä ce titre, la considerer comme la plus simple parmi toutes les theories de catastrophes possibles. On peut justifier l'attention portee ä cette theorie de la maniere suivante: l'experience nous a appris que la Nature, pour autant qu'elle le peut, tend ä operer par les voies les plus simples. Puisque les dynamiques gradients possedent cette qualite de simplicite, on doit s'attendre ä ce que ces dynamiques soient tres repandues. II en est bien ainsi en physique: gravitation, electromagnetisme et optique, thermodynamique parfois."
One can imagine the effect of gradient-dynamics by considering a hilly district with peaks (maxima), valleys, basins (minima), shelves, passes (saddle points) etc. If an object falls into this landscape it will not rest on the peaks but rather roll into the valleys and eventually stay in some basin. The peaks are called (unstable) repellors, the basins are called (stable) attractors. The force Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 255 applying to the object äs it rolls down the valley is called gradient. In the case of our example the object falls down: we consider the negative gradient. We can now introduce in a more formal way concepts we have already used more informally.
For each point u (u = (ui , . . . , u^) ) of the controlspace (IRk) the potential field at the point u is considered: Vu. If u = 0 and if we have only one internal variable x, the gradient of Vu can be represented by a vector-field on the x-axis (cf. Fig. 10 ). In the case of two or more internal variables the computation of the gradient is more complicated. We have to consider partial derivations.
Example: Vu has the internal variables KI and x2 that is to say the gradient results from two vectors, one pointing to the maximum in the direction of the variable Xj the other going in the direction of the variable x2. Fig. 18 shows in a graphical way the procedure applied. As we shall only elaborate on unfoldings with one internal variable, the generalization to n variables is not immediately relevant (but we need the notion of partial derivation).
We can define some basic notions of catastrophe theory presupposing the notions of potential field and the Separation into the state-space IRn and the control-space IRk. The following definitions are based on manifolds in IRn and IRk (cf. Bröcker and Jänich, 1973: 1) M c IRn, C c= IRk Def. 1: Given a potential field Vu(x), then the pair (x, u) e M X C is a critical point of Vu(x), if grad Vu(x) = 0.
In the case of x = Xi, it follows that critical points must fulfill the equation (2) (2) grad YU(XI) = YU(XI) = 0.
Def. 2:
The set of singularities of Vu(x): 2 is defined äs: 2 = {(x, u)/(x, u) is a critical point of Vu(x)} (also called catastrophe set).
Def. 3:
The bifurcation set: Bif (Vu(x)) contained in 2 is defined äs: (u € C/3x e M, such that (1) (x, u) is a critical point (2} Vu(x) is degenerate in u} Remarks concerning the term: "degenerate":
(a) In the case of x = {x]}, i.e. M <= R1, the function Vu(x) is degenerate if
Example: In Fig. 13 we showed the derivations of the function f(x) = x3; the critical point was given by: f'(x) = 3x2 = 0, i.e. it was situated in the origin (x = 0). At this point the second derivation is also zero: f"(x) = 6x at x = 0 gives f"(x) = 0. We can say that the origin of this function is a degenerate critical point.
(b) In the case of x = JX], x2} i.e. M cz R2, the function Vu(x) is degenerate if the Hesse-determinant is zero. The Hesse-determinant can be computed on the basis of the matrix:
The computation of the Hesse-determinant follows the rule:
(c) If M c: Rn (n > 2) we must consider the Hesse-matrix and its submatrices. (Cf. Wildgen, 1979a: 83-85 for an example with x = {xls x2}).
The set of bifurcation points represents one type of catastrophic points, because the dynamics change drastically in the environment of these points. Fig. 13 and 14 give a good impression of a structural change in the environment of a bifurcation point. We shall present further examples in the next section. Another type of catastrophic points exists: these are called conflict-points (or conflict-strata). They occur if two minima have the same potential. Such a point of dynamic equilibrium is unstable.
Def. 4:
The set of catastrophic points consists of:
(a) the bifurcation points (cf. Def. 3), (b) the conflict points, where two minima of Vu(x) have the same potential.
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The term "catastrophic", like the term "catastrophe", refers to similar dynamic features of natural catastrophes (for example the breaking of a dam) where continuous and slow processes (changes in the rock, the augmentation of the water level by the rain etc.) have a sudden dramatic effect by which a prior state of stability is changed and a new stable state is reached. In our more abstract use of catastrophe theory these associations of the term "catastrophic" are of minor relevance. We can distinguish two different types of catastrophes depending on the amount of delay we assume before the change takes place. The choice of one of these types depends on informal considerations; Thom introduced the label "delay convention" for this.
(a) The perfect-delay-convention.
The dominance of an attractor (a minimum) is preserved until the attractor disappears. Fig. 19 . gives an impression of this type. The catastrophic points are always bifurcation points (cf. Def. 3). In the next section we shall apply the techniques introduced up to now and study the geometry of the first two unfoldings: the fold and the cusp. 
The Geometry of Two Elementary Unfoldings:
The Fold and the Cusp (a) The fold Organizing center:
(1) V = x3 Unfolding:
(2) Vu = x3 + ux Set of critical points 2: (3) {(x, u): grad Vu = 3x2 + u = 0} BifurcationsetBif(Vu): (4) (u : 3x (x, u) e 2 and Fig. 21 shows the unfolding of V = x3, which is a curved plane in IR3. Comparing Fig. 21 with Fig. 14 we recognize that the external variable has similar effects äs the deformation by the small factor E in section 3.1. As we only have one external variable, u, the axes of observable, real (relatively slow) processes have to be parametrized by u. The fast dynamics, i. e. the internal dynamics responable for the stability or the instability of states is represented in Fig. 22 by its orbits ( = classes of vectors) which are marked by double arrows. In the domain of u > 0 we have only one orbit (IR). At the bifurcation point this orbit is separated into three orbits (IR+, IR~, 0). The fas-t Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 259
x Fig. 22 dynamic has an equilibrium position at x = 0. In the domain of u < 0 we have five orbits. The upper line of the parabola x2 + u = 0 contains attractors (= minima), the lower line contains repellors (= maxima). One gets a good idea of the fast dynamics if one imagines a ball rolling down the plane represented in Fig. 21 . In the domain of u < 0 it is caught by a minimum, whereas in the domain u > 0 it goes straight down the plane. If we apply definition four to the fold, we see that one catastrophic point exists: the origin. As this point is a bifurcation point, it follows that only processes following the perfect-delay convention can be handled by this elementary catastrophe.
(b) The cusp Organizing center:
(1) V = x4 Unfolding:
(2) Vu = x4 + ux2 + vx Set of critical points: 2 (3) {(x, u, v): 4x3 + 2ux + v = 0} Bifurcation set: Bif (Vu) (4) {(u, v) : i: 4x3 + 2ux + v = 0 ii:12x2 + 2u = 0}
The solution of (i) and (ii), such that the internal variable x is eliminated, gives us a semi-cubic parabola described by (5) 2/v2 + 4u3 = 0.
As the unfolding of V = x4 is contained in IR4 (the dimensions being: V, x, u, v) we cannot represent it graphically. Fig. 23 gives the graph of the set 2.
We can represent the graph of the function V for single points in the plane of external variables (u, v) . The lines L! , . . ., L4 in Fig. 23 show that the number of critical points depends on the values one chooses in the (u, v)-plane. In Fig. 24 we show the potential function V along th parallels LI , L2, L3 and L4 (lines in (x, u, v) with u and v constant). In Fig. 24 (a) and (d) (the lines L! and L4 cut the catastrophe set 2 only once) the potential V has just one minimum; in (c) there is a saddle-point and in (b) the function V has three critical points: two minima and one maximum. Line L2 cuts through the "conflict-area" where two attractors (minima) coexist. The different areas are defined by equation (6). Fig. 25 shows the graph of the semicubic parabola together with the graph of the function V at single points in the (u, v)-plane. u l Fig. 25 As the actual processes described by this dynamic model change the control parameters u and v, we can represent them by different paths in the plane (u, v). There are four structurally different classes of paths in the bifurcation plane (Bif) of the cusp (cf. Wildgen, 1979a: 215-227) . Fig. 26 shows the paths KI , K2, K^ and K/j.
The character of the corresponding processes can be read from the representation of the function Vu(x) at different points of the paths. Fig. 26 shows the "evolution" of Vu(x) along KI, where no dramatic change is happening. On the path which describes the evolution along K2 a simple minimum bifurcates and we get a conflict of two minima. On the path K3 we have a conflict area in the middle. There is a new minimum appearing at the intersection of K3 with the bifurcation line at P2. The old minimum disappears at point P4. The conflict of minima is resolved by a change in dominance. Whereas K2 encounters one catastrophic point (Pi) which is a bifurcationpoint, K3 crosses two bifurcation points and one conflict point (P3) in the middle of the conflict area. K3 is therefore catastrophically richer than K2.
We shall give equivalents of these basic processes äs empirical models in the next chapter.
4, Dynamic Models in Word Semantics. Foundation and Applications
This chapter will first present basic principles and definitions which control the application of catastrophe-theoretical structures to semantics. The second section gives a summary of the semantic archetypes which can be derived from the elementary catastrophes. The details of the derivations are contained in Wildgen, 1979a: 253-411 . In sections 4.2. to 4.4. we treat those problems of word semantics which have already been introduced in chapter l (1.2. -1.5.).
l Basic Principles
We need principles for the correlation of the purely mathematical structures of catastrophe theory to the semantic structures underlying language. The principles which we enounce could certainly be further specified and augmented so that the methodologically important activity of interpreting formal structures in terms of an empirical model would be further clarified.
First prindple
The stähle attractors of an elementary catastrophe are interpreted äs statte semantic entities involved in processes, events and activities. Their characteristic realizations are nouns, adjectives, nominals and terms.
Remark: The categories noun, adjective and term belong to the realizational level of language. These structures can only be arrived at after a series of further derivations, which are of another type than those considered here. Semantic archetypes belong to the level of "mentation" and not the level of "action" (active realization) (cf. Goldman-Eisler, 1958, 230) .
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Second prindple
The type of dynamic 'accidents' (= catastrophes) happening along a path through the bifurcation set are fundamental sources for verbs and verbal expressions, Remark: Verbs are no longer classified äs static relations, operators with operands etc. They are rather an integral part of propositional gestalts. One can refer to Tesnieres metaphor that verbs "govern" the sentence. In our model they are rather the dynamic center of a gestalt, the nominal agents being the necessary filiers for the case frame of the verbal center. This principle will become clearer when we derive the list of basic propositional gestalts in the next section.
Third prindple
The semantic archetypes are local structures in the sense that we consider only the environment of singular points in the bifurcation set. As the set of elementary catastrophes has a subordinating structure, we can embed simple archetypes into complex ones, such äs to build a structure of "scenes" and "perspectives" (in the sense of Fillmore 1976 and .
Remark: This principle integrates the main ideas of the "frame-and-scenes" semantics in Fillmore (1976 Fillmore ( , 1977b . The hierarchy of elementary catastrophes gives a natural explanation of the semantic facts observed by Fillmore.
Principles one and two can be further specified äs we distinguish different entities which can take the Status of attractors in a dynamic field. Some of these distinctions have already been utilized. The most basic type of interpretation is the localistic Interpretation. The dynamic field is a domain. The points regulated by the fast dynamics (they are 'caught' be the attractor) are individuals (objects, animate beings).
The localistic interpretation presupposes a space-time substratum. This is the reason why we can consider it the most fundamental interpretation. The next type is related to the first one, äs space-time is replaced by a more abstract location in the space of qualities. Normally very specific subspaces form the background of simple dynamic schemes (only these can be derived from elementary catastrophe theory). We call this interpretation the qualitative interpretation. The "domains" of a process can also be phases in the flow of events and actions. The catastrophes are, in this case, phase transitions. If such an interpretation is considered, we call it phase interpretation. These interpretations are also localistic in a wider sense; the domains are defined äs stable states of a dynamic System.2 1t is typical of the above mentioned interpretations: -the localistic interpretation, -the qualitative interpretation, -the phase interpretation, that we have one central agent (object or animate being) which is affected by the process without really being part of it (the stability of this agent and its existence are not in danger).
A second group of interpretations differs from the first by the fact that the attractors are interpreted äs agents of the process. This group of interpretations is linked to the localistic types (in the wider sense) by the fact, that the agents may subsist all over the catastrophes considered, it is only their relation (dominance, freedom, possessor-possessed, body -body-part, controlled-released) which is changed by the process. The notion of a deeper subsistence of actors has been exposed by Thom (1973: 641) :
"Par une generalisation naturelle, on peut admettre que tous les actants subsistent, en se partageant l'espace fibre des variables internes. . . . On dispose ainsi d'un moyen tres general pour representer geometriquement les types les plus frequents d'interaction spatiale entre actants, notamment ceux qui apparaissent dans la regulation biologique." We can call these interpretations agent interpretations. They were at the beginning of Thom's development of dynamic semantics (cf. the lists of archetypes in Thom, 1970: 248 and in Thom, 1977: 312) . Our treatment generalizes Thom's proposals which were much influenced by the applications of catastrophe theory in morphogenesis (cf. the title of Thom's book; Thom 19727 1975 Thom 19727 /1977a .
The agent interpretations can be subdivided into:
(a) possession l transfer ofpossession archetypes The dominance relation defined by the Maxwell convention is interpreted äs a relation ofpossession, control, keeping, containing between individuals (stable gestalts).
(b) (instrumental) interaction archetypes.
The agents are involved in different kinds of actions which can be reduced to the elementary types of "capture" and "emission" (cf. 4.1.3.). The structure of the elementary interactions which are derived from paths in the bifurcation space of elementary catastrophes, defines different roles which can be roughly compared to the "schemas actantiels" proposed by Tesniere (1959) and to the "case frames" classified by Fillmore (1968, (cf. äs an example Wüllner, 1827). In 1935 Helmslev reviewed the work of the localists and proposed his own System of cases which is partially localistic. In recent times Anderson (1971 Anderson ( , 1977 and Ikegami (1976 Ikegami ( , 1978 have presented different models on the Basis of localistic assumptions. The connection of the catastrophe-theoretical model to other theories in semantics has been discussed in Wildgen, 1979a: 109-194 .
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(1) In the preverbal character of archetypes. The structures proposed by Tesniere, Fillmore and others are only generalizations of linguistic structures found in natural languages). (2) The foundation of the classification of archetypes in a formalism which is supposed to be basic for many biological Systems. It is therefore universal in a very deep sense and it is of interdisciplinary relevance. (3) The semantic archetypes are irreducible gestalts. They are not composed in a simple combinatorial way. This fact constitutes a major difference in Thom's theory against all theories proposed up to now. Some of these have tried to describe field-like structures, but äs no tool for consequently doing so was available they all drove away irresistably attracted by the static-logical paradigm. After these very theoretical remarks we can procede to a first definition of the term: semantic archetypes.
The finite classification of elementary catastrophes allows the derivation of a finite list of elementary process types. If these are interpreted following the principles enumerated above, we get semantic interpretations of the elementary process types. These are called: semantic archetypes3.
A Summary of the "Propositional Gestalts" Derwable from Elementary
Catastrophes In this section we shall give a rather informal summary of the derivation of propositional gestalts exposed in Wildgen, 1979a: 253-431 . The archetypes found by Thom in Thom (1970 have been integrated into our list. His proposals are the heart of our own treatment. We shall, however, not discuss the many differences and augmentations contained in our treatment.
The ZerQ-Unfolding
The organizing center of this unfolding is V = x2 and we have already shown in chapter three that it is structurally stable under small deformations. Consequently no fundamental process type can be derived from this "unfolding". Nevertheless, the internal stabilization of this function under deformation has analoga in the field of word semantics.
(a) The semantics of mass terms (gold, water, wood etc): It is characteristic for the referents of these terms that they can be deformed and divided without changing their identity (not including the molecular or atomic levels of de-composition). Their independence from influences and deformations can be correlated with the stability of the 0-unfolding. This archetype of stähle existence is a specialization of principle one which interpretes every attractor (attractors have locally the shape of the 0-unfolding) äs nominal entities. In the case of mass terms the regulation of the stability and identity of the objects referred to is particularly simple. Other objects need complicated mechanisms to regulate their stability, this is most obvious in the case of living beings. These mechanisms are, however, not elementary and cannot be described in our framework. The archetype of stable existence is a sort of mother type for the semantics of nominals. (b) We arrive at more interesting structures, if we consider versal unfoldings of the same function. Fig. 27 shows the germ V = x2 unfolded by a versal (non universal) parameter p. The external parameter p is the axis of possible processes (the external time). This is the archetype of continuous processes without accidents. Schematically we can represent it by a line which has open ends at both sides.
diagram l
The interpretations are rather simple:
-localistic: to be (exist, live, stay) in an unbounded domain. example: A exists (somewhere) -qualitative: persistent quality
In case an individual who possesses the quality in question is presupposed äs the background, we get the type of inalienable qualities. They appear and end with their support; relative to their background (possessor) they are unbounded. example: B is animate / human / . . . If B is a human being this quality is inalienable; i.e. those qualities which constitute the identity of an object are invariant qualities of this object äs long äs it exists (in its proper form).
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-possession: In the case of inalienable possession the possessed object is stable äs long äs the individual who possesses it exists. example: B has his head (on his neck)
-interaction: the basic archetype is that of living, belonging to the field of potential interaction. As the same process structure can be derived from the cusp (V.= x4) which is the next 'compact' catastrophe, if we consider the class of paths K! (with u > 0), this archetype is very often realized äs a perspective of higher archetypes. The following examples point to such higher archetypes. examples: B sits, lies, Stands / is placed, situated on/at/in P B owns, has, contains (some object 0) More generally we get positions of rest before or after a phase of change which is not explicitly mentioned. It is clear that a person sitting in a chair can move, or that a town situated on the coast can be displaced (after some political "catastrophe"). In a local (restricted) perspective the verbs: sit, lie, stand, be situated at, own refer to a state of stability The integration of this low archetype into higher archetypes has already been indicated in principle three (cf. section 4.O.).
The Fold
The geometry of the fold and its catastrophe and bifurcation set have been described in chapter 3.5. The unfolding contains only one external variable, which must be chosen äs the process axis. We can distinguish three main areas around the bifurcation point. Diagram 2 shows the Separation between areas where a stable attractor exists and areas where none exists. For the derivation of the localistic interpretation it is more suggestive to consider a second, versal parameter in addition to the universal one. This gives us Fig. 28 which shows the domain of stability M and its edge (along the versal parameter which transforms the bifurcation point into a bifurcation line without changing the dynamic structure of the whole). 
(b) The qualitative Interpretation
The stable domain M is occupied by some alienable quality; the loss of the quality does not speficy another quality (the loss of a stable quality can, however, be labelled by an adjective äs in alive -dead, married -single (unmarried) where the asymmetry of the Opposition is not so clear äs in the case of negated adjectives). The Opposition between the domains M and -M is a complementary or contradictory one. -A Those adjectives which are typical realizations of complementary oppositions are not gradable. As we dispose of the general means of negation of qualities, we can realize the archetype of complementary Opposition between qualities using any adjective or nominal.
(c) The p h äse Interpretation
Many verbs refer to a change between stable and unstable states and viceversa. The differences between stability and instability are, however, often context dependent. The most general change in stability is expressed by the verbs: die (= a living being loses its stability, its stable identity) to come to life (french: naitre) (= a living being gains its identity, its stability äs a creature) In the domain of body movements we encounter similar complementary constructions äs in: Lyons (1977) calls these pairs of verbs "directional oppositions". Each of these verbs contains a contrast between the stability of a later (come) or a prior state (go away) and the complementary instability of the prior or the later state. The complementary state is not given explicitly. It is only qualified in a negative manner äs being different from the stable state which is indicated. This asymmetry is not an absolute one, the archetype derived from the fold can be embedded in a correspondent archetype of the cusp, which describes the change between two states in bipolar Opposition. The propositional gestalt: A come s to M2 and A leave s M} can thus be embedded in the Symmetrie gestalt: A moves from Mj to Af2- 
The Cusp
The unfolding of the germ V = x4 has two external variables u and v and an infinity of paths can cross the (u, v) plane. In Wildgen (1979a) we have classified these paths (a similar classification was suggested by Rene Thom) and derived the corresponding archetypes. We shall only consider one class of paths (K3) A short look at diagram 3 and 4 shows that this process type contains two perspectives which correspond to archetypes derived from the fold. The phenomenon of a "jump" between two attractors and the partial coexistence of two attractors is, however, a totally new phenomenon.
Our description of the different interpretations of this process type can only be a short summary, for more details cf. Wildgen (1979a: 265-307) .
(a) The localistic Interpretation
We get the archetype of local change from place (domain) MI to place M2. A moves from MI to M2 (walks, drives, travels, . . .)
(b) The qualitative Interpretation
We get the archetype of bipolar quality change. The dynamics can be illustrated if we consider the pair of adjectives: awake -asleep.
Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 271 Fig. 29 shows the areas of the two qualities 'awake' and 'asleep' and considers to processes in the quality space corresponding to A falls asleep A wakes up Fig. 29 The bipolar organization of a quality scale is a very productive principle in all languages. The methodology of the semantic differential introduced and applied by Osgood (cf. Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1967 and Osgood, 1976) on. The archetype of "giving" can be derived from the next compact catastrophe in the hierarchy, the butterly (V = x6). Some realizations of the archetype of change in possession are: Object O changes from/passes from possessor MI to M2 (O is an invariant of the process; it is not the interpretation of an attractor but Stands f or the point which moves on the path K3 through the bifurcation plane).
All the interpretations of the process type illustrated by diagram 5 can be subsumed under the heading "change" (cf. Thom, 1977a: 312) .
(e) The interaction interpretation
This interpretation is the one which motivated Rene Thom most. We have two attractors M! and M2 which come into conflict. The central "jump" can be interpreted äs a change in dominance (presupposing the Maxwell convention) thus yielding another archetype of change.
We can, however, consider separately the two bifurcations in diagram 5. If the attractors M! and M2 are interpreted äs agents we obtain very naturally the archetypes of capture and emission. They model those basic processes which have already been described in section 1.2. äs basic biological activities.
M2
Diagram 6
Agent MI emits/throws/gives away/ lets free/ secretes agent M2
Diagram 7
Agent MI catches/takes/graps/subjugates/absorbs/devours agent M2 Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics
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The process diagram allows also the Separation of two types of agents: MI: the primary agent, is not created or destroyed by the catastrophe M2: the secondary agent, is created/destroyed by the catastrophe. This dynamic distinction can be correlated with traditional semantic labels such äs: agent -object (agentive case -objective case), agent -experiencer, causer -affected/effected. The transposition of the dynamic characterization to syntactosemantic structures cannot be elaborated in the frame of this paper.
(f) The instrumental Interpretation
The interactions described under (e) are biologically basic äs we can find similar dynamic interactions in all living beings. In later evolutionary stages almost all creatures have developed an oppositon between central and peripheral body parts. With the existence of limbs and the Prolongation and differentiation of limbs by the use of instruments new action types have evolved, which can be called instrumental. The secondary agent can now be interpretated äs a limb or an instrument. Applying this interpretation to diagrams 6 and 7 we get the following (instrumental) interactions: (a) reaching, tending (with the arm, with the instrument) (b) taking back (the limb), recovering (the instrument) The actions performed with the aid of limbs and instruments very often have a cyclical and repetitive character. If we consider cyclical paths in the bifurcation set of the cusp, we can derive some basic archetypes of body movements.
We consider M0 äs a state of rest and MI äs a state of tension. According to Zeeman (1972) we obtain a qualitative model of heart beating (where the two states are called diastole and systole). The archetype of beating which can be derived is rather rudimentary äs it describes only the change between two states: (a) the body has its limb close to itself (in a neutral position of rest): M0, (b) the body has emitted/erected the limb (instrument) (in a position tension): M! of examples: Agent A beats (with its limb/instrument B) Agent A jumps If the cycle is run through repeatedly, we get: A waves, wags, etc. More generally it can be said that most movements such äs walk, run, dance . . . are perceived äs combinations of such "beating" processes (cf, Johansson, 1976 Johansson, , 1977 for experimental results confirming this hypothesis).
There remains the class of abstract interpretations, which are transpositions of physical actions to the domain of mental, emotional and social activities. We prefer to treat these on the level of attributional dynamics äs they are too remote from basic biological mechanisms which are the proper domain of the universal morphology developped by Rene Thom. Our Separation of different interpretations of basic process types was already a first step into this domain, although we aimed exclusively at a better approximation of the semantic structures of natural languages. Attributional dynamics needs a broader interdisciplinary foundation especially in social psychology and anthropology (ethnomethodology included).
The Butterfly
Organizing center: (1) V = x6 Unfolding: (2) Vu = x6 + tx4 + ux3 + vx2 + wx The set of critical points (catastrophe set) 2: {(x, t, u, v, w): 6VU
(3) öx -= 6x5 + 4tx3 + 3ux2 + 2vx + w = 0}
The bifurcation set is defined by (3) and (4): {(t, u, v, w): (3) ^ (4)}: 62V
(4) 6x2 = 30x4+ 12tx2 + 6ux + 2v = It is very difficult to show the geometry of this catastrophe. Even the bifurcation set which has four variables (t, u, v, w) can only be illustrated with the aid of partial graphs where at least one of the four variables is held constant. The number of types of paths is also considerably augmented. For a detailed analysis of this catastrophe and the archetypes which can be derived from it, we must refer to Wildgen (1979a: 340-371) . We shall only consider one characteristic and dynamically rieh path in the plane of the variables (u, v) ; the other external variables w and t take constant values (t is negative and w is small). Fig. 30 shows the graph of the bifurcation set under these conditions. We consider a path parallel to the parameter u which cuts the "swallowtail" just above the conflict point where three conflict lines (= lines of unstable equilibria) intersect. The potential field for the points a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i, j on the path are shown in diagram 9 together with a schematic representation of the attractors, their bifurcations and the "jumps". The strong line indicates In a simpler case where (c) does not hold, we derived the archetype corresponding to the Path-case of Fillmore (1971) . The three attractors are interpreted äs:
MI: source, M2: path, M3: goal example:
John travels from Munich (M^ to Rome (M3) via Florence (M2) In the process type described by diagram 9 we do not have isolated domains of existence for MI , M2 and M3 rather a conflict structure between MI and M3 which is complicated by the appearance of M2. The changes in dominance are therefore the principle characteristics of this process type. Fig. 31 shows the interrelation of the conflict strata (curved planes in the space (v, w, u); t is a negative constant).
in the"pocketi outside The small pictures in the lower part of Fig. 31 show how the conflict strata are embedded into the bifurcation set (the strong lines are conflict lines and represent sections of the conflict plane in the (v, w, u) plane above). The
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(a) The qualitative Interpretation The primary attractors M! and M3 establish a bipolar Opposition comparable to the qualitative interpretation of path K3 in the bifurcation set of the cusp. If the path cuts across the "compromise pocket" (cf. Fig. 30 and 31) , the conflict between two opposed qualities splits up and a new intermediate attractor situated between the two extremes is created. Isnard & Zeeman (1976) used these dynamic structures to model the compromise zones in political decisions (hawk -versus -dove, cf. also Zeeman 1976) . The compromise zone is qualitatively different from the other areas in the bifurcation set äs it is strictly bounded, relatively small and äs a change in the external parameters t and u causes the compromise zone to disappear. This zone is therefore called metastable.
The qualitative interpretation of this dynamic phenomenon is straightforward. We have two stable extremes MI and M3 and a metastable "compromise" M2 between them. It is important that the compromise value is not a differentiation of one of the two extremes; it rather focusses on the indifference zone between the two extremes making it an attracting domain. The following example illustrates a process in such a three-valued qualitative domain. In this case we have a delay phenomenon such that the catastrophe line depends on the direction of the process. "Armistice" and "mobilization" are two different compromise zones. These zones can develop into one stable compromise zone which is called "cold war". This state has much relevance in a world under the influence of two political blocks, where the state of war is too risky.
(b) The transfer interpretation If we Interpret the dominant attractor äs a state of possession (or äs a state of stable control, stable social relationship), we can elaborate the archetypal structure found in section 4.2.3.(d). Fig. 32 shows the process along the path indicated in Fig. 30 and analysed in diagram 10 (below). Fig. 32 contains only the external parameter u to which the path is parallel (cf. Fig. 30 ). Introducing the internal variable x we can now show a section of the catastrophe set 2 (with u, v, and t constant). Strictly speaking we should only say that A has 0 in the Stretch of the process where A has emitted 0 and dominates it. If, äs Thom suggests, we consider the agents äs fundamentally coexistent (in the fibre space of internal Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 279 variables, cf. Thom, 1973: 641) the emission of 0 is to be interpreted not äs the beginning of existence of 0 but äs the Separation of 0 from A, 0 enters the scene äs an agent which can potentially play a role in the interaction. The domain (a) is therefore one of stable possession (0 does not act freely), in (b) 0 Starts to become independent from A but it is still controlled by A, in (c) 0 is free from the dominance of A, it is dominant itself, in (d) 0 is again dominated by one of the coexistent and primary agents: MI . If we change the parameter v which controls the path, the zone of dominance of 0 (c) is narrowed and disappears, i.e. the prominence of the object and its intermediate independence is governed by another mechanism. In Wildgen (1979a: 339 ff) these controls are called: higher archetypes. The following sentences show that the phase of "self-possession" of the object is variable in natural realizations of the archetype of transfer. In (i), the fact that the apple has a field of independence between Eve and Adam is not explicitly stated, in (ii) we have at least a Separation of two partial processes and in (iii) the apple obtains a certain independence (äs long äs it is in the air).
(c) The instrumental Interpretation
If we consider cyclical paths through the bifurcation set and if the attractors are interpreted äs agents, we can derive the instrumental archetype with three attractors (M0 = agent/source, M! = instrument, M2 = experiencer/goal). Diagram 11 shows the shape of this process type which is a Prolongation of the process described by diagram 10.
M 2 M,
Diagram 11
The instrument MI is emitted by the agent/source MO, it hits (touches, affects) the experiencer/goal M2 and comes back to be integrated into the agent/source which is marked äs the neutral position of the process. This archetype elaborates the archetype of hitting (affecting) derived in section 4.2.3.
example:
The farmer hits the donkey with a stick Mo M2 M!
In this section we enumerated the most important semantic archetypes derivable from elementary catastrophes with one internal variable. In Wildgen (l979a) we tried to derive: (a) all elementary archetypes, (b) the principal secondary archetypes,4 (c) the main higher archetypes.5 Although the geometry of unfoldings with more than one internal variable is not yet fully known, we have been able to derive some special instrumental archetypes from the compactified umbilics. As these derivations can only be described after a detailed mathematical introduction we shall only mention the principal types of propositions described by these archetypes. The table of morphological archetypes in Thom (1977: 312) contains these archetypes but no derivation. The derivation proposed in Thom (1970: 239ff) has been partially invalidated by Thom's Suggestion in Thom (1977a: 91) :
"En ce qui concerne les ombilics, on ne pourra les associer ä une catastrophe de bifurcation localement stable qu'en les considerant dans le deploiement universel de la singularite V = x4 + y4 (le "double cusp", selon C. Zeeman). Cette singularite est de codimension algebrique egale a huit (topologique sept): eile n'apparait donc generiquement que par des associations de catastrophes sur IR4. Le deploiement du double cusp peut presenter quatre minima; on peut donc obtenir dans le deploiement universel de cette singularite, des interactions comportant le conflit de quatre regimes. Certaines de ces interactions peuvent etre localisees au voisinage d'un ombilic parabolique; on leur donnera, au chapitre 13, une Interpretation linguistique." The geometry of the umbilics had been investigated by Godwin (1974) and Poston (1974) (cf. also Bröcker and Lander, 1975) . They showed that the parabolic umbilic has maximally two minima; the derivations in Thom (1970) were therefore inadequate. In Wildgen (1979a: 385-410) we have shown that Thom's proposals in 1970 can be substantiated using the compactified versions of the umbilics (embedded in the double cusp). The main results of our analysis were: 282 W.
(a) The archetypes with specialized instrumental functions can only be derived from the compactified umbilics, i.e. from the double cusp. (b) The archetype of the messenger can be derived from the compactified elliptic umbilic (using the results reported in Posten and Stewart, 1978: 240, where (b)). In the two following sections we shall summarize these important aspects of propositional gestalts.
A List of Archetypal Structures in the Verbal Lexicon
The semantic classification of verbs is a traditional domain in linguistic research. Nevertheless the analyses proposed up to now have had only poor results. They come about in more or less accidental subdivisions of the verbal lexicon. Most Systems agree with a fundamental subdivision into Stative and nonstative verbs. The nonstative verbs are subdivided into verbs describing processes, events and actions (cf. Bartsch, 1976: 369) and further into verbs of movement, communication, mental verbs etc. (for a summary of the classifications proposed for German verbs cf. Orthen, 1976: 95 -106) . The most serious drawback of these proposals comes from the fact that the verbal lexicon is grouped around some class labels whose choice is almost arbitrary. The criterium of proximity used in this procedure is usually not made explicit (for an informal access to this problem cf. Ballmer & Brennenstuhl, 1978) . The semantic unity of the verb classes proposed remains insecure.
A first attempt to represent the content of verb classes in a quasi-iconic way was made by Schank (1972) , but the optic indexes used were not systematically justified, they are rather conventional diagrammatic representations.
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The aim of our classification is to define basic semantic structures which are language-free in the sense that they belong to a prelinguistic stage of gestaltperception and recognition. We hope to evince by this means the circularity of the classifications proposed up to now. The schematic representation of the interaction of attractors along paths in the bifurcation set furnishes a quasiiconic language for the description of verbs.
We can obtain a first basic subdivision in the set of archetypal processes by opposing the class of structurally stable functions (which have only versal unfoldings and no catastrophe point) to structurally unstable functions (which have one or more catastrophe points). The subclassification of the non-stative verbs is much more difficult. On the one hand we have a list of basic dynamic schemes derivable from the set of elementary catastrophes (i.e. from typical paths in the bifurcation set). On the other hand these schemes demand a more specific interpretation. We have to decide how the attractors and their bifurcations have to be interpreted (cf. section 4.O.). The principles of interpretation presuppose basic processes of social perception, social focussing on special relevancies and social attributions (simple phenomena of causation and of agent responsibility). Experimental results of Michotte (1963) have proved that this basic level of attribution is independent of semantic features and special contexts. Confronted with light dots which move on a screen people tend to Interpret systematic correlations between points äs holding, letting free and causing the movement of the other dot (cf. also Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976: 94-100) . The integration of these fundamental attributional principles in our description of propositional gestalts was therefore not an arbitrary expansion of the mathematical structures found in catastrophe theory. Our System of interpretations differs from the one proposed by Thom (1970: 234) who distinguished: (a) Physical interpretations, (b) biological interpretations. We consider instead: (a) Localistic interpretations, (b) action/interaction interpretations.
Whereas Thom had the field of physical and biological sciences in mind, when he designed his interpretations, our access is rather integrated into the framework of language philosophy and communication studies. We believe that the two accesses are congruent.
We shall now briefly summarize the types of verbs found in the previous section. Our exclusion of abstract verbs has to do with our reluctance to enter the proper domain of attributional dynamics. We think, however, that many mental actities and feelings are labelled in analogy with concrete process types; i.e. the structure of this part of the lexicon is secondary to the one dealt with here (cf. Perls, 1969 , for arguments in favor of this assumption). The verbs with four attractors (nominal participants) whose derivation had been sketched in the last section are not included in our list. We presume that further analyses of the double cusp catastrophe underlying these verbs will result in a larger list of propositional gestalts with four attractors. Table 3 Archetypal Dynamics in Word Semantics 285
A List of Nominal Roles Contained in the Set of Propositional Gestalts
The following list summarizes the role-structures of nominals in the proposi tional gestalts which were derived in section 4.2. The semantic roles correspond roughly to the "deep cases" proposed by Fillmore (1968) and to the participant roles described in valence theory (Tesniere, 1959; Heibig, 1969) . The archetypal level is, however, deeper äs it is not derived from distributional or syntactic features of sentence realizations. We can distinguish two levels: (a) the purely formal level of process structures, (b) the elementary attribution of semantic content by the different types of Interpretation.
Archetypal Structures in the Lexicon ofQualities 4.5. l The Color Lexicon and its Differentiation
In section 1.3. we have argued that the mechanism of color perception follows the opponent-cell scheme. The dynamic structure of perception in this domain is therefore bipolar, i. e. we have two attractors in Opposition (or in conflict). This conflict domain is a zone where two centers of a quality scale compete. We can assume two frontiers of the Opponent reaction which correspond roughly to the bifurcation lines of the cusp. The cusp is a first dynamic model of the phenomenon, which could be replaced by a more specific model which mirrors the quantitative results of research in color perception. Our aim in this section is, however, to develop a first qualitative model for a larger class of phenomena, which can be related to our use of perceptual adjectives. The development of color terminology in a linguistic Community is governed by dynamic principles situated at another level. The basic principle is that of bipolar Splitting and differenciation; it is not modelled by a path parallel to v (cf. Fig. 32 ) but a path paralllel to u. In his applications Zeeman calls this external variable Splitting factor.
Two different dynamic principles seem to apply in the case of the differentiation of our color terminology: a fold-like differentiation between white (positive) and black (negative) and a cusp-like recursive differentiation of the domains white and black.
(a) The differentiation between light-warm and dark-cool
We have one positively characterized term: light-warm which labels the existence of an excitation and one negatively characterized term; the absence of luminosity: dark-cold. In section 4.1. we have shown that this type of asymmetrical constellations is modelled by the fold (germ: V = x3). The domain which is positively specified is first separated. With the differentiation light-warm the negatively defined complementary field is enriched by contrast and can be differentiated in its turn. We can thus reconstruct The further stages of the process of color differentiation apply the same principle to the results of previous processes. The process of color differentiation can be called a linguistic "unfolding" of latent perceptual categories. The degreee of unfolding depends on the cultural context, whereas the structure of the unfolding is governed by the mechanisms of color perception.
We presume that similar mechanisms underly other qualitative differentiations.
Dynamical Structures in the Lexicon of Adjectives
In section 4.2. we have already shown that there exists a systematic qualitative interpretation of process types derivable from elementary catastrophes. We shall first summarize the main results of this interpretation and then comment on a subclassification of adjectives proposed by Seiler (1978) and Thom (1978) .
A list of adjectives derivable from elementary catastrophes: Table 4 In the following we shall comment on the proposals made by Seiler (1978) and Thom (1978 We presume, however that the partition of the scale into matter adj./ color adj./ evaluative adj./ affective adj. does not mirror the basis and universal subdivisions. We assume that the following dimensions are basic.
(a) Adjectives dependent on the perception of objects Adjectives whose meaning is more or less controlled by perceptual data are assembled in this domain. As the structure of our sensory organs is varied, we must differentiate among visual, acoustic, tactile, olfactory and gustatory qualities. The result of our perceptual analysis is much richer in the visual domain than in the gustatory domain for example. (b) Adjectives dependent on our internal drive System
In the case of affective adjectives it is clear that this field is governed by primitive and evolutionarily old mechanisms (desire-aversion). The structure of these mechanisms which can be roughly localized in central domains of the brain (hypothalamus, subcortical kernels, parts of the reticulary formation, cf. Brüter, 1976: 127-132 ) serves äs basic organizational scheme for the more abstract quality spaces. This leads to the evaluative scales mentioned by Seiler (1978) . These phenomena corroborate the basic bipolar distinction proposed by Thom (1978: 80) , between the object (perceived) and the interpreter (perceiver).
The further differentiation seems to be more complicated so that the proposals of Seiler (1978) and Thom (1978) can only be considered äs first approximations. We think that the syntax of the noun phrase can only give rough hints at the basic semantic categories.
In Thom (1973 Thom ( , 1978 further proposals for the semantic organization of the lexicon are discussed. As they are on the one hand speculative and on the other hand mathematically difficult we shall not discuss them in this context.
Some Conclusions
The models proposed in this article constitute a first elementary level of a dynamic theory of semantics. The domain of word semantics äs well äs that of "deep" syntax call for a dynamic treatment, äs they cannot be exhaustively described with the help of combinatorial (distributional) or algebraic tools. The surface forms are too poor and the basic organizational principles are not realized morphologically or syntactically. We assume that the methodology applied in this article which brings together results from psychology (neurophysiology) and new mathematical results in differential topology is fundamentally adequate to the problems of word semantics.
Our results are shadowed by the fact that this is the first systematic application of catastrophe theory by a linguist. As a consequence many questions are still open. We shall give a list of desiderata hoping that other investigators will join this very new and promizing field of research.
List of desiderata: (a) The dynamic principles underlying nominal composition. As the work of Brekle (1970) , Kürschner (1974) , Levi (1978) and many others suggest a finite list of propositional types is used in nominal composition. In we have shown that the basic types used by Brekle (1970 Brekle ( , 1976 and Warren (1978) can be reconstructed in our framework and that by this we obtain a highly structured basis for the generation and interpretation of nominal compounds.6 (b) The ellipsis of the main verb in pidginized speech. In Wildgen, 1978b and Wildgen, 1979a : 438-443 we applied our methodology to a sample of elliptical sentences from the Heidelberg Corpus. (c) Vagueness and the dynamics of words. Many of the phenomena described in quasi-quantitative terms by fuzzy-semantics can be modelled qualitatively in the framework of dynamical semantics (cf. Wildgen, 1980b) . (d) Lexical fields. If the empirical aspects treated in this article are further elaborated, a dynamical theory of lexical fields will be the natural continuation of it.
All these applications should not hide the fact that: (a) Up to now only elementary catastrophe theory can be applied äs the nonelementary structures are not yet classified (in a simple and perspicuous way). Our mathematical tool can therefore only be applied to semantic phenomena which are not combinatorial (syntactical) in their nature. We hope that the mathematical basis will be broadened by future research (cf. Chillingworth, 1976 and Thompson & Hunt, 1978) . (b) The whole field of Attributional Dynamics has not been developed up to now. We need more sophisticated tools (for example game theoretical models equipped with dynamical concepts) and more empirical research in this domain (cf. Görlitz et alli, 1978 for recent advances in attribution theory). 6 A larger research on the generation and understanding of nominal compounds which is empirically and experimentally oriented is being undertaken at the University of Regensburg under the direction of Prof. Herbert E. Brekle.
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These severe restrictions must be kept in mind otherwise the advantages of the model exposed in this article vanished and triviality would be the consequence (cf. some of the criticism in Sussman & Zahler, 1978) .
